Devolution, one of the biggest constitutional developments in recent decades, is entering a new chapter. The so called “No. 10 of the North” (NTON) is being championed as the ‘nerve centre’, the governing nexus, of a devolved state. Transferring power from Whitehall to the rest of the UK has the potential to improve the relevance and impact of public policy for those living outside of London. However, the creation of a new entity that will support the execution of the prime minister’s policy agenda must be established via a transparent and accountable process. “Presidentialism” and “sofa government” are anathema to devolution and, more broadly, democratic accountability. As the proponents of a NTON believe, the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of the PM (presidentialism) is an ill-suited model of government if the goal is to deliver what people need in their daily lives and local communities. The unilateral circumvention of the cabinet by the PM (sofa government) is similarly inappropriate.
We must therefore properly scrutinise this potentially dramatic shift in the superstructure supporting Britain’s highest political office. A clear and transparent governance model for a NTON – which does not publicly exist at the time of writing – is an essential prerequisite for this next phase of devolution. The purpose of this article is to provide evaluative criteria in the event that a NTON comes into existence. There are many hurdles this entity will have to overcome before it can exist, but it is important that the agenda for such an entity is not solely dictated by the prime minister (or prime minister elect). By pre-empting the publication of a clear plan for NTON, this piece will provide a rigorous governance model by which its legitimacy can be assessed. This will stimulate open and democratic debate about the form and structure of a future NTON.
Roles, Responsibilities, and Organisational Structure
As has been suggested by Robert Hazell, the publication of a NTON organogram would aid transparency and accountability. The NTON should be chaired by a publicly named director who is expected to report to the public at regular intervals via the media as a spokesperson for the PM. Their competency should be clearly demarcated as devolution and regional affairs, rather than holistic policy control, which should be left in the hands of the PMs regular spokesperson. The NTON should have a committee under the director with the chief aim of identifying for the public the individuals with the most power to influence policy. Committee members should be expected to act in the spirit of section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. They should have regard to long-term consequences, the interests and reputation of the UK and its people, collaboration with businesses and other countries, and most importantly the impact of their actions on society.
The size of the committee should not exceed a number of individuals that could be reasonably expected to provide personal advice to the PM on a regular basis (approximately 12 individuals). The size of the committee should not exceed that of the cabinet. This is because the NTON should not only avoid duplicating the Whitehall No.10 operation but also undermining the cabinet. As the cabinet is undoubtedly a fundamental part of the constitution, it would be against the spirit of Miller No.1for its constitutional arrangement to be altered by the prime minister alone. The creation of a new entity with a similar scope, scale, and composition as the cabinet would jeopardise its role as the government’s main decision-making entity. The replacement or duplication of specific ministerial portfolios is similarly inadvisable on the basis that it risks undermining the fundamental constitutional functions of individual ministers of the crown.
All staff employed by the NTON underneath the committee members should live within 150 miles of its office location. This is to ensure the NTON is not staffed by London or Whitehall civil servants who rarely if ever travel outside of the capital. The NTON will be best placed to achieve its aim to improve the lives of people in the UK’s regions if it draws talent that is immersed in the communities for which it designs policy. It is important that the PM does not invest disproportionate time and energy into the specific policy concerns of individual regions (see below). However, those NTON employees are employed to advise the PM on regional and devolution policy and therefore should be subject to a greater community immersion requirement.
Appointments
All appointments should be governed in the spirit of the merit and ethics principles that underpin many other public offices. Dynamism in the appointment of the personal advisors to the PM is desirable and to be expected. However, due consideration must be paid to the quality of service to be expected from staff employed with public funds. While NTON functionally operates under the PM, both ultimately serve the British people. A meritocratic appointments system ensures that the needs of the British people are represented in NTON appointments alongside those of the PM. It is for this reason that the NTON should emulate the meritocratic requirements set out for the judiciary in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Civil Service in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Likewise, in order to ensure this principle is manifested in practice, NTON director and committee appointments should be examined by an equivalent of the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) and the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC). There are two reasons why nominees should be vetted by independent arbitrators who are empowered to disqualify nominees. The first is the quality of service or value for money argument mentioned above. The second is the maintenance of public standards, a point to which I will elaborate upon shortly. In light of both longstanding ethical issues regarding public servants and recent high-profile scandals, a transparent and clearly governed vetting process is necessary.
Scrutiny and Oversight
The NTON should commit to the publication of frequent and transparent updates on its business and affairs. This reporting should be conducted by the NTON itself as well as independent scrutinisers. Two independent observers should be permanently stationed in the NTON to ensure its governance model is properly upheld and that its staff adhere to the usual principles expected of public servants (see below). These observers will publish a report at the end of each parliament (i.e., every 5 years) and have recourse to the House of Commons Committee on Standards, House of Lords Commissioners for Standards, and the Civil Service Commission in the event of serious misconduct. Reporting to these entities ensures that all MPs, peers, and Civil Servants likely to be employed in the NTON are held accountable according to usual and established mechanisms. In the event of serious misconduct, the observers should notify the correct authorities upon immediate discovery of wrongdoing. Unlawful or criminal activity should also be reported by the observers immediately to the correct authorities.
The primary purpose of these observers is preventative, as they provide tacit behavioural pressure upon NTON officials. As many of us will know, the presence of auditors or any officials tasked with scrutinising and documenting our behaviour has the potential to change it. While it may also increase working pressures on NTON staff, it will do so in a way that incentivises greater professionalism. They can be compared to Ofsted school inspections, though differing in the fact the inspection is continuous. This will subject high-ranking governing officials to the same scrutiny many citizens already face.
A Governing Charter
The NTON should have a publicly available charter setting out its organisational structure, purpose and governing principles, appointments and accountability processes, and other important factors. It is important to publish the purpose and principles of the NTON in order to justify its creation to the electorate. The NTON will require significant public investment which should be supported with clear and transparent reasoning that can be used to evaluate its success. From an accountability perspective, a restatement of the Nolan Principles and the requirement that officials under the PM should resign if they fail to live up them should be included. It may be desirable to exempt the PM from an explicit resignation criterion in the NTON governance model, as it potentially adds additional pressure to an office already subject to high churn likely to the detriment of the public interest – I recommend further discussion on this point. Regardless, the Nolan Principles should form the basic structure of the charter alongside any additional principles desired by the PM that are compatible with the model proposed in this article.
Relocating part of the PM’s operations outside of London and the creation of a new government entity must be open to scrutiny. The success of the NTON is also contingent upon the support of – or at least tacit acceptance by – the public, politicians, the media, and academia. As we have discussed above, the NTON should have clearly governed processes for appointments and scrutiny. But the existence of these processes can only be fully successful in terms of public support and policy credibility if they are visible, transparent, and can be used as evaluative criteria. There are many other factors (practices, ideas, and structures) that should be included in the charter. One important example is a commitment to a maximum amount of time spent by the PM in the NTON. The PM is a UK government official and the capital city is in London. Regional inclusion in the business of government may be desirable. However, a new and novel operational unit that is not subject to the same longstanding counterbalances as other parts of the state should not be given carte blanche to consume the PM’s time. A commitment to a maximum amount of time spent in the No. 10 of the North, however that is quantified, ensures the prime minister’s focus is not overinvested in region-specific policy.
The Basis for Constitutionality
It would be inappropriate for a “presidential” model of government to develop in the UK through the decisions of the prime minister alone. Robust measures to prevent such a development, such as those I have set out above, must form the basis of the NTON’s governance model. The set of measures proposed here is non-exhaustive and heavily dependent upon behavioural or conventional factors. Statutes and potentially judicial review remain available in the event the NTON enables prime ministerial overreach. However, the length of the statutory process and the reactive nature of these measures respectively mean they are not available as part of an immediate and pre-emptive approach. We must work collaboratively to ensure the NTON is created the right way. The foundations of a governance model for the NTON I have offered here should serve as the catalyst for a lively and constructive dialogue. Established properly, governance systems provide predictable and legible frameworks that enable positive outcomes. It is for others to decide whether devolution or greater focus on regional development have the potential to unlock growth and improve people’s daily lives. It is clear that the time to collaboratively develop a governance model for the NTON is now, before “presidentialism” has the chance to derail its admirable aspirations.
