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A friend of mine recently mentioned the role of friendship in modern society, suggesting that developing friendships could be the solution to many of the issues we face. This reminded me of an ancient Roman concept, amicitia. A concept with no direct equivalent in English amicitia is somewhere between a professional and a personal relationship, combining a level of intimate personal connection with business-like pragmatism. This article will discuss the lessons we can learn from ancient thought about friendship.
What is Amicitia?
In De Beneficiis, Seneca differentiates between ‘ordinary’ and ‘true’ amicitia.[1] According to him, a true amica is not just someone who we know, but someone who truly makes us feel attachment to them. On the other hand, an ordinary amica is perhaps little more than someone you would only say hello to on the street.[2]
Seneca implies that most of our relationships can be classified as ‘ordinary’, that we live our lives in places ‘full of people, but void of friends.’[3] He goes on to say we ‘must look for a friend, not in a reception hall, but in the heart’, implying that it takes effort to find friendships.
By referencing the heart, Seneca suggests ‘true’ amicitia is based on love, or at least affection. It is contrasted with superficiality, implying ‘true’ amicitia is unique or special, with greater depth than the majority of our relationships.
Seneca’s suggestion is that it is worthwhile to develop ‘ordinary’ amicitia into ‘true’ amicitia. Doing so requires conscious and deliberate effort.
In its ‘true’ form, amicitia share many similarities with our modern conception of friendship. By contrast, it is fair to say that a relationship based solely on superficial pleasantries, the kind that we may have with our acquaintances and colleagues today, is not friendship.
Aristotle and the Different Forms of Friendship
Seneca’s two kinds of amicitia can be compared with Aristotle’s forms of friendship. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle names three types of friendship:
- Friendships of Pleasure
- Friendships of Utility
- Friendships of Virtue
Friendships of utility and pleasure are based on the potential benefits to be gained from the friendship. Friends of utility might provide worldly gain, such as increased status or investment opportunities, whereas friendships of pleasure are based on generally agreeable qualities, such as someone’s ability to make us laugh, rather than a deeper love for what they truly are.[4]
True friends should not expect something in return for their friendship.
The last form according to Aristotle is friendship of virtue, which occurs when people ‘wish the good of their friends for their friends’ sake’.[5] True friendship is not transactional but consists of two or more individuals who genuinely care for each other without an expectation of profit or gain. True friends should not expect something in return for their friendship. A good friend acts on trust, selflessly loving another with no guarantee that it will benefit them. In an ideal friendship, this trust flows in both directions and the relationships is mutually beneficial.
Love, Friendship, and Cicero
Love is an important aspect of friendship. In De Amicitia Cicero says that friendship ‘springs rather from nature than from need’.[6] This means that friendship is not merely the product of self-interested necessity but is ‘an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love’.[7] Interestingly, Cicero says that amicitia is etymologically descended from the word amor, love,[8] showing that the deep links between friendship and love were expressed through language.
The discussion of friendship in Nicomachean Ethics frequently refers to love, including ‘self-love’.[9] There are two kinds of self-love, ‘ordinary’ and ‘exceptional’. Ordinary self-love irrationally pursues money and status, whereas exceptional self-love consists of the rational and controlled pursuit of ‘the things that are noblest and most truly good’. This means the pursuit of things that are good in their own right, not because of the external benefits they convey, such as virtuousness, temperance, and true friendship.
According to Aristotle, a certain level of healthy love for oneself is required to able to be a good friend. A person who is obsessed with personal gain will struggle to selflessly care for another. If we are to develop ‘true’ friendships, we not only need to selflessly care for our friends but treat ourselves to a healthy amount of self-love.
Friendship and Society
In a final note from Aristotle, it seems likely that friendship is not only important in our personal lives, but is the very ‘bond’ of the state, creating ‘concord’ between citizens.[10] If all citizens in a polity were true friends, a justice system would be redundant, as the bonds between citizens would prevent immoral and criminal action.
Friendship, therefore, is not only worthwhile in its own right, but is also the root of civil harmony, health, and happiness.
There are innumerable contemporary arguments to supplement a societal argument for friendship. Social connectedness has been shown to be a ‘key determinant’ of adolescent mental health. Both life satisfaction and happiness marginally increased in the UK population after the end of lockdown measures, which allowed people to return to normal social habits. There is even evidence to suggest maintaining social relations is linked to better long-term health and life expectancy.
Friendship, therefore, is not only worthwhile in its own right, but is also the root of civil harmony, health, and happiness. As such, whether we follow the example of the ancient Romans with their amicitia, or heed the even more ancient words of Aristotle, incorporating trust and genuine care for other people into relationships that typically lack depth seems like a necessity for the betterment of society.
[1] Seneca, De Beneficiis, 6.34.2-5.
[2] Seneca, De Beneficiis, 6.34.4.
[3] Seneca, De Beneficiis, 6.34.5.
[4] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1156a10-20.
[5] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1156b10-14.
[6] Cicero, De Amicitia, 8.
[7] Cicero, De Amicitia, 8.
[8] Cicero, De Amicitia, 8.
[9] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1168a30-1169b4.
[10] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a20-30.
Sources
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. by H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 73, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926).
- Cicero, ‘De Amicitia’, On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination, tr. by W.A. Falconer, Loeb Classical Library 154, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923).
- ONS, Coronavirus and the Social Impacts on Great Britain (1 April 2022) <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandwellbeing/bulletins/coronavirusandthesocialimpactsongreatbritain/1april2022> [accessed: 16/01/2024].
- Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban, ‘Loneliness and Social Connections’, Our World Data, (February 2022) <https://ourworldindata.org/social-connections-and-loneliness> [accessed: 16/01/2024].
- Seneca the Younger, Moral Essays, Vol. III: De Beneficiis, tr. by John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library 310, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935).
- Winstone, Lizzy; Becky Mars; Claire M.A. Haworth and Judi Kidger, ‘Social Media Use and Social Connectedness among Adolescents in the United Kingdom: A Qualitative Exploration of Displacement and Stimulation’, BMC Public Health, 21:1736, (24 September 2021) <https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-021-11802-9#citeas> [accessed: 16/01/2024].